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SUBJECT Greater Syria

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

Early in October 1948 Hilmi Abu-Khadra, a Palestinian leader who was in Damascus, was called to the Presidency and asked by President Quawatli to join the Gaza Government. Abu-Khadra refused, stating that his family and the Husaynis were old enemies and that, even for the sake of Arab unity, he could not join them.

- 2. At about the same time Abu-Khadra received a letter from Amman, asking him to go there to discuss with King 'Abdullah of Transjordan the possibilities of becoming a minister in 'Abdullah's Palestine Government. On 10 October Abu-Khadra went to visit King 'Abdullah, carrying with him a petition signed by leading Palestinian refugees in Syria. This petition asked King 'Abdullah to promise to protect the refugees and their families, in return for their efforts (which the refugees stated were getting under way on a large scale) against the Mufti and his Gaza Government and in support of the Greater Syria plan. Abu-Khadra pointed out to 'Abdullah that the Palestinians in Syria would be a valuable spearhead for any action that might be taken against the Syrian Government in connection with the Greater Syria plan.
- 3. Upon his return to Damascus in the middle of October, Abu-Khadra conferred with Masib Bakri and Sami Khabarah, Damascus deputies, and other Palestinian leaders. According to Abu-Khadra, King 'Abdullah had stated that "the Greater Syria question would be settled by 1 January 1949, if not sconer."

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Comment. A second report from the same source states that Hasan Hakim, former Syrian Prime Hinister, and Masib Bakri had sent 'Abdullah a request for instructions in the middle of October and had received a reply on 26 November which stated that their services would not be needed in any realization of the Greater Syria plan. Source stated that both men were extremely angry and told friends that 'Abdullah had dropped them because he was now sure of himself and was getting rid of unnecessary leaders, so as to avoid embarrassment in giving out important posts when the new government would be formed. Source adds that Hakim attempted to get an audience with President Quwwatli on 27 November. For recent activities of Sami Khabarah see

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- l. President Quwwatli and his Foreign Minister, Muhsin Barazi, are more concerned than ever, as Greater Syria activities gain momentum in Syria.

 Recently, a "friend" of the President Comment. Probably an Iraqi official, as a well-informed source stated that the Iraqis were at work on a "compromise solution") suggested that, should Greater Syria become inevitable, President Quwwatli could certainly find a major role for himself in the new government. The President became very angry at the suggestion and stated flatly that he would never have anything to do with "Abdullah and that, if Greater Syria should be established, he would accept such consequences as would be meted out to a "Syrian nationalist leader," or he would go abroad to continue his fight against Greater Syria.
 - 5. President Quawatli feels that 'Abdullah has a fifth column within Syria in the form of the anti-Mufti Palestinian refugees. Accordingly, he has instructed the Sureté to keep certain Palestinians under surveillance, and to take such steps as are necessary to forestall any planned activities of this group.
- 25X1X 6. Confirmed the fact that Hasan Hakim seemed to be inactive in his Greater Syria work and generally disaffected on the Greater Syria question (see paragraph 3).

CONTREMENTIAL

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